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ON THE PROSECUTION OF C. ANTONIUS IN 76 B.C. 
1. The Problem 
In his speech in toga candida, Cicero belittles his competitors for the 
consulship as follows: quem enim aut amicum potest habere is qui tot cives 
trucidavit, aut <clientem> qui in sua civitate cum peregrino negavit se iudicio 
aequo certare posse?' The second half of the sentence refers to his ultimate 
colleague in the office, C. Antonius, as Asconius informs us: 
Clientem autem negat habere posse C. Antonium: nam is multos in Achaia 
spoliaverat nactus de exercitu Syllano equitum turmas. Deinde Graeci qui 
spoliati erant eduxerunt Antonium in ius ad M. Lucullum praetorem qui ius 
inter peregrinos dicebat. Egit pro Graecis <C. Caesar>2 etiam tum adulescen- 
tulus, de quo paulo ante mentionem fecimus; et cum Lucullus id quod Graeci 
postulabant decrevisset, appellavit tribunos Antonius iuravitque se ideo eiurare 
quod aequo iure uti non posset. Hunc Antonium Gellius et Lentulus censores 
[70 B.C.] sexennio quo haec dicerentur senatu moverunt titulosque subscripse- 
runt, quod socios diripuerit, quod iudicium recusarit, quod propter aeris alieni 
magnitudinem praedia manciparit bonaque sua in potestate non habeat3 (Asc. 
Tog. 84.12-25 Clark).4 
This paper had its origins in E. Badian's seminar on Julius Caesar at Harvard University in the 
fall of 1991. Our thanks go to Professor Badian, whose questions, criticisms and guidance 
contributed materially to the argument we advance here. 
I Asconius Tog. 83.26-84.3 Clark. Clientem is supplied in this lemma from Asconius' 
comment (quoted just below). All references to Asconius are to Clark's edition by page 
and line number. 
2 Plutarch's report (see note 4 below) supports the insertion of Caesar's name here. 
Asconius had referred to Caesar in his argumentum to this speech (83.4) and again at 
83.18. 
3 From the primary sequence verbs here it looks as though Asconius is reproducing the 
"charges" either as they were formulated by the censors (perhaps changing the mood, but 
not the tense) or as Cicero reported them in his speech (a distinct possibility, given the 
vivid diripuerit - a favorite word with Cicero - and the tricolon format). 
4 This is the only reliable information on the case. Plutarch gives a version (6 SE Kadiiap 
dteti3o6evo; ?v1 EXXdSa Tf; xpoOftia; cruvy6peVoev anZ16t n16iktov [sic!] 'AvtdvIov 
,BtaKO1)an &wpoSoKia; E't AEco6XXo1 MdpKou ?o0 MaKESOvi'ar [sic!] OTpavnfl'o. KCfl 
toaoi3tov toyXUoEv, &aToe T6v 'Avt6viov bnwcaXiaaOat xoi; 8iIadpxoU;. ,CrnIdaievov 
OVk XEVTv tO6 IGOV F qv t 'EXXcii np6; "EXXIva [Plut. Caes. 4.2]), but is unreliable. Even 
if we leave aside his giving Antonius the praenomen Publius, Plutarch has misunderstood 
Historia, Band XLIV/1 (1995) 
? Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Sitz Stuttgart 
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The exact nature of the matter brought before Lucullus is not self-evident 
and has not, we think, been sufficiently elucidated. Since Antonius had plun- 
dered the allies, one might suppose that he should have been haled before the 
quaestio de pecuniis repetundis, yet the Greeks whom he despoiled lodged their 
complaint with the peregrine praetor. Some decision on the part of the praetor 
seemed so unjust to the college of tribunes that they quashed the case despite 
Antonius' apparent guilt (the censors later thought his guilt so manifest that 
they threw him out of the senate even though he had not been convicted), and 
since there is no further mention of the case before the judgement of the 
censors, it would seem that the case was dropped after the tribunes' ruling. 
What was the charge against Antonius? What was the decision of Lucullus 
which was so unsettling? Investigation of the matter should start by determin- 
ing in what capacity Antonius carried out his depredations. 
II. Antonius' Position in Greece 
According to Asconius, Antonius' activities took place while Sulla was in 
Greece - that is to say between 87 and 83. We do not know Antonius' age 
exactly, but the year 105 is the latest possible for the birth of a consul of 63; he 
is likely to be older - probably in his twenties during the eighties B.C.5 Nor do 
we know when he was quaestor, only that he must have held the office before 
his expulsion from the senate in 70. However, it is very unlikely that he was 
quaestor before 87 and it is likewise unlikely that a quaestor elected under the 
dominatio Cinnae would be found serving Sulla in Greece. Hence we can 
conjecture that he served in some capacity below that of quaestor. 
the case, thinking that Lucullus was praetor in Macedon and that Antonius claimed he 
could not receive justice when tried for plundering Greeks in Greece. This garbling is 
most likely Plutarch's own attempt to explain a situation he did not understand. One 
cannot determine his precise source here, but according to H. Peter (Die Quellen Plut- 
archs in den Biographien der Romer [Halle 1865] p. 129) it "scheint nicht zu den 
schlechtesten gehort zu haben." Plutarch can't have used Asconius unless he could 
completely misconstrue qui ius inter peregrinos dicebat and think it means "in Greece". 
Not only that. but he "knows" that Caesar was taking the case as a favor for the Greeks, 
and that bribery was involved. On &opo6onia, see p. 52 below. The author of the 
Commentariolum petitionis ascribed to Q. Cicero was probably familiar with the facts 
only as reported in Cicero's speech (and even then he oversimplifies - see note 55 below), 
but because of our scrappy knowledge of that speech we are grateful for his confirmation 
of Asconius' report of the censorial nota: eorum alterius bona proscripta vidimus, vocem 
denique audivimus iurantis se Romae iudicio aequo cum homine Graeco certare non 
posse, ex senatu eiectum scivimus optima censorum aestimatione (Com. pet. 8). 
5 His elder brother (Plut. Ant. 1) M. Antonius Creticus (RE 29) was not praetor until 74 and 
could have been born at the latest in 1 13. 
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His control of cavalry units suggests a praefectura equitum. The precise 
phrase used to define his command - nactus de exercitu Syllano - is peculiar, 
however; it sounds as if it ought to refer to someone from outside the army who 
had gained the use of the turmae equitum. If Antonius had been a legitimate 
officer of Sulla's army in Greece, one might expect Asconius to have said 
something like nam is praefectus equitum in Achaia multos spoliavit.6 The 
phrase Asconius does use may mean either of two things. Antonius may simply 
have gained the services of these equites for his depredations, presumably 
through the cooperation of their commander. Cicero, however, refers to Anton- 
ius with the phrase in exercitu Sullano praedo.7 We can reconcile these appar- 
ently contradictory pieces of evidence by supposing that Antonius got himself 
appointed as their commander and then used them for his own purposes. 
There is a parallel for the latter case. During Cicero's proconsulship in 
Cilicia, Brutus recommended to him two negotiatores, M. Scaptius and P. 
Matinius, to whom he claimed a debt was owed by the town of Salamis in 
Cyprus.8 Scaptius sought from Cicero a praefectura equitum with which to 
force the Salaminians to repay the debt. Having obtained just such a post from 
Cicero's predecessor Ap. Pulcher, he had been using his turmae aliquot equi- 
tum to besiege the bouleuterion when Cicero entered his province and cancelled 
the commission.9 Cicero refused Scaptius the appointment he sought, having 
from the outset of his proconsulship made it his policy to grant no prefectures to 
negotiatores.'0 Not every governor showed such restraint, however, and the 
position of Scaptius, who, despite the fact that he was a businessman pursuing 
private interests (interests that Cicero protested were very much contrary to the 
well-being of the province' "), was given a prefecture and control of equites, is 
6 On Asconius' penchant for specifying in what capacity a man acted as he did, see C. 
Damon, HSCP 94 (1992) 231-34. 
7 Asc. Tog. 88.21 Clark. 
8 Ad Att. 5.21.10, 6.1.5. The affair is the topic of ad Att. 5.21.10-12, 6.1.3-7. 
9 Appius noster turmas aliquot equitum dederat huic Scaptio per quas Salaminos coer- 
ceret, et eundem habuerat praefectum (ad Att. 5.21.10); fuerat enim [sc. Scaptius] 
praefectus Appio et quidem habuerat turmas equitum quibus inclusum in curia senatum 
Salamine obsederat, utfame senatores quinque morerentur (ad Att. 6.1.6). 
10 Negavi me cuiquam negotianti dare quod idem tibi ostenderam (Cn. Pompeio petenti 
probaram institutum meum, quid dicam Torquato de M. Laenio tuo, multis aliis?) (ad Att. 
5.21.10); id vero per te exceperamus ne negotiatori [sc. praefecturam deferrem]; quod si 
cuiquam, huic tamen non (ad Att. 6.1.6). The verb exceperamus indicates that Cicero 
stated this intention in his provincial edict. It turns out rather to the detriment of Cicero's 
vaunted integrity that he was not opposed to handing out such prefectures, so long as they 
were exercised outside of his province: ego tamen quas per te Bruto promiseram praefec- 
turas, M. Scaptio, L. Gavio, qui in regno rem Bruti procurabant, detuli; nec enim in 
provincia mea negotiabantur (ad Att. 6.1.4). 
11 At ille [sc. Scaptius] profert senatus consultum Lentulo Philippoque consulibus UT QUI 
CILICIAM OBTINERET IUS EX ILLA SYNGRAPHA DICERET. cohorrui primo; etenim 
erat interitus civitatis (ad Att. 5.21.11-12). 
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probably a good parallel for that of C. Antonius in Achaia in the mid-eighties. 12 
Scaptius owed his appointment to the governor of the place in which he wanted 
to make use of the forces; the man responsible in the mid-eighties for what 
Asconius calls Achaia was of course Sulla.13 We must now consider the lex de 
repetundis in order to assess the options for redress open to the victimized 
Greeks. 
III. Antonius and the Law on Extortion 
Starting from 171 the Romans instituted special ad hoc courts to deal with 
accusations of wrongdoing on the part of Roman magistrates in the provinces. 14 
In 149 L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi established the first permanent quaestio, the 
quaestio de repetundis.'5 The senatorial juries of the court proved themselves 
incapable of punishing fellow senators and in 123 Gaius Gracchus transferred 
jury duty in this court to the equites Romani. Substantial fragments of his law 
are preserved on the tabula Bembina.16 In a move which was to lead to much 
12 Similar appointments to legateships were apparently not uncommon; see Cic. Leg. 3.18: 
iam illudapertum estprofecto, nihil esse turpius quam quemquam legari nisi reipublicae 
causa. omitto quem ad modum isti se gerant atque gesserint, qui legatione hereditates aut 
syngraphas suas persecuntur. in hominibus est hoc fortasse vitium, sed quaero, quid 
reapse sit turpius quam sine procuratione senator legatus, sine mandatis, sine ullo rei 
publicae munere? quod quidem genus legationis ego consul, quamquam ad commodum 
senatus pertinere videbatur, tamen adprobante senatu frequentissimo, nisi mihi levis 
tribunus plebis tum intercessisset, sustulissem. 
13 In 88, Sulla was allotted as his province Asia and the bellum Mithridaticum (Vell. 2.18; 
App. Mithr. 22, BCiv. 1.55). The tribune P. Sulpicius Rufus carried a law transferring 
command of the war to Marius (references in MRR sub anno 88). After Sulla's flight to 
his army and return to Rome he had Sulpicius' law annulled, apparently arguing that his 
measures had been passed per vim (Cic. Phil. 8.5, cf. Plut. Sulla 8.2-3) - as in fact they 
were! Whatever later enactments were passed regarding Sulla's position under the domi- 
natio Cinnae were doubtless quashed retroactively after Sulla's return in 83. At this 
period there was no fixed province of Achaia; rather, when necessary it was overseen by 
the governor of Macedonia (see S. Accame, ll dominio romano in Grecia dalla guerra 
acaica ad Augusto [Rome 1946] 147-56). Plut. Sulla 11.5 shows that the terms of Sulla's 
command gave him precedence over the governor of Macedon in Boeotia (or at least that 
this is what Sulla's quaestor L. Lucullus argued on his behalf in a confrontation). All 
evidence indicates that in the 70s, Sulla must have been viewed as the legitimate 
commander in Achaia in the 80s. 
14 For discussion of early procedure de repetundis, see W. Eder, Das vorsullanische Repe- 
tundenverfahren (Munich 1969) 24-57, and C. Venturini, Studi sul 'crimen repentunda- 
rum' nell'etai repubblicana (Milan 1979). 
15 Eder, op.cit. (n. 14) 58-119. 
16 This Gracchan law is almost certainly a lex Acilia, though both the identification of the 
tabula Bembina as the Gracchan law and the Gracchan law as the lex Acilia are much 
disputed. For a modern discussion with bibliography, see A. Lintott, Judicial reform and 
land reform in the Roman Republic (Cambridge 1992). 
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quarrelling in later years, Gaius restricted the application of his law to elected 
magistrates of the Roman people and their sons, thereby exempting members of 
the equestrian order from liability to charges of extortion.'7 In 54, when the 
eques C. Rabirius Postumus was indicted under the quo ea pecunia pervenisset 
clause of a later lex de pecuniis repetundis (the lex lulia) this exemption was 
still valid, as Cicero repeatedly insisted in his speech on behalf of Rabirius.18 
The version of the law that would have been in effect in 76 B.C. was Sulla's, 
some of the provisions of which are discussed below. 
Could the charge against C. Antonius in 76 have been extortion? At one 
point in the Strafrecht Mommsen views the case as an instance of a repetundae 
charge brought before the peregrine praetor.19 But later in the same work he 
indicates that the action simply illustrated the non-citizen's right to lodge 
before a civil court a case which might also have fallen to the quaestio de 
17 Line 2 describes those subject to the law as [... quei dic. cos. pr. mag. eq. cens. aid. tr. pl. 
q. iiivir cap. iiivir a.d.a. tribunus mill(itum) l(egionibus) IIII primis aliqua earum fuerit, 
queivefilius eorum quoius erit, quoius pater senator siet. The higher part of the list can be 
supplemented from Lines 8 and 16 (Dic., cos., pr., mag. eq....; ...tr. pl., q., Ilivir. cap., tr. 
mil. 1. liii primis aliqua earum, triumvir a.d.a....); only the offices of censor and aedile 
must be conjectured. The restriction of the law to only the military tribunes of the first 
four legions indicates that the category represented was magistratus populi Romani; as is 
well known, only those military tribunes were elected, the rest being appointed by the 
consuls. Mommsen emended the part of the preserved text reading quoius pater senator 
siet to <queive> quoius<ve> pater senator siet, arguing that this part was parallel to the 
preceding one bringing the sons of magistrates within the law's compass and that the 
emended part ought to include the magistrate's fathers. It is not clear how exactly 
Mommsen intended his emendation to be understood, the second -ve in particular being 
puzzling. It is clear, however, that the clauses are not parallel: the second has siet in place 
of erit and a present subjunctive is not parallel to a future indicative. One can make better 
sense of the received text by understanding the siet clause as a relative clause of 
characteristic whose antecedent is thefilius of the preceding clause. The law then restricts 
itself to the "sons of any of them (sc. the aforementioned magistrates) whose father is a 
senator." In this case the law exempts the sons of those magistrates who were not 
senators, the offices below aedile not automatically leading to admission to the senate. 
18 Datur tibi tabella iudici. Qua lege? Julia de pecuniis repetundis. Quo de reo? De equite 
Romano. At iste ordo lege ea non tenetur (Rab. Post. 12, and see note 30 below). 
19 With regard to his assertion that sons were liable for funds they extorted during their 
fathers' magistracies ("wegen der wahrend der Funktion ihrer Vater empfangenen Gelder"), 
Mommsen comments in a footnote, "Dies scheint das Gesetz Sullas abgeandert zu haben; 
denni im J. 678/76 wurde gegen den Sohn des M. Antonius Consuls 655/99 C. Antonius 
die gleiche Klage bei dem Peregrinenprator angestellt... Schwerlich ist, wo die Quastion 
zulassig war, anstatt derselben die Privatklage angestellt worden." Th. Mommsen, Ro- 
misches Strafrecht (Leipzig 1899) 711 n. 5. Mommsen seems here to be connecting C. 
Antonius' case in some way with his father. But clearly the case arose from events in 
Greece in the 80s having nothing to do with M. Antonius cos. 99 (and killed by Marians in 
87). 
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repetundis.20 This view, however, has little evidence to speak for it and derives 
from Mommsen's idiosyncratic view that the quaestio de repetundis developed 
from iudicia publica, that is special civil cases "in gescharften Formen".2 
In an article arguing against Mommsen, Buckland challenged his interpre- 
tation of Antonius' case on two grounds.22 First, Antonius was not a magistrate 
with imperium, so that case cannot serve as an instance of the prosecution of ex- 
magistrates under civil jurisdiction. Buckland's second argument is that a 
governor's extortionate subordinates were brought before a civil court, not 
before the quaestio de repetundis.23 He cites two instances. The first is the case 
of C. Verres, whom M. Aemilius Scaurus coerced into appearing as a witness in 
Scaurus' case of repetundae against Cn. Cornelius Dolabella by threatening to 
use against Verres evidence which Scaurus preferred to use against Dolabella.24 
20 He states, "Der Nichtburger kann zwar in gleicher Weise in dem gewohnlichen ProzeB 
sein Recht geltend machen," and in the accompanying note adds, "Dieser Privatprozel 
war, wie das acilische Gesetz zeigt, nicht an die lastigen Termine der Quastion ... 
gebunden, und er mochte auch unter Umstanden praktisch sich mehr empfehlen als die 
immer politische Aktion des offentlichen Verfahrens. Der ... ProzeB gegen C. Antonius 
gehort in diese Kategorie." Mommsen op.cit. (n. 19) 722 with n. 3. This concep6ion is 
directly contradicted by Cicero who asserts in the divinatio in Q. Caecilium that while the 
citizen could seek redress in the civil courts, the quaestio de repetundis was erected 
especially for the succour of provincials: quasi vero dubium sit quin tota lex de pecuniis 
repetundis sociorum causa constituta sit; nam civibus cum sunt ereptae pecuniae, civili 
fere actione et privato iure repetuntur (18). 
21 Mommsen, op.cit. (n. 19) 706-09, 721-27; Romisches Staatsrecht (Leipzig 1885-87) 
1.168, 2.223ff., 583, 3.359. Basically, Mommsen argued that the term iudicium publicum, 
later simply a synonym for quaestio, originally referred to special civil cases in which the 
public interest was concerned and the state intervened in the proceedings. He saw the 
institution of the quaestio de repetundis in 149 as the time when the iudicium publicum 
was merged with the investigatory quaestio. However, his conception that there was such 
a special civil procedure before 149 is almost certainly wrong. His evidence (mainly ? 95 
of the lex Ursonensis [Bruns 27]; also the official delivery of witnesses in ? 55 of the lex 
Mamilia Roscia Peducaea Alliena Fabia [Bruns 151 and the aqueduct edict of Venafrum 
[Bruns 77.66ff.]) is Caesarian or later and doubtless shows the influence of the quaes- 
tiones perpetuae on civil procedure rather than vice versa. For a criticism of Mommsen's 
conception of the development of the quaestio de repetundis, see W. Kunkel, Untersu- 
chungen zur Entwicklung des romischen Kriminalverfahrens in vorsullanischer Zeit 
(Munich 1962) 12-14, 52-54. 
22 W. W. Buckland, "Civil Proceedings against Ex-magistrates in the Republic", JRS 27 
(1937) 37-47. 
23 This may have been true under the Empire but seems dubious in the Republic. For 
imperial evidence see Mommsen, Strafrecht (n. 19) 713. 
24 Quae omnia, etiamsi voluntate Dolabellaefiebant, per istum [sc. Verreml tamen omnia 
gerebantur... Itaque M. Scaurus, qui Cn. Dolabellam accusavit, istum in sua potestate ac 
dicione tenuit. Homo adulescens cum istius in inquirendo multafurta acflagitia cognos- 
set, fecit perite et callide; volumen eius rerum gestarum maximum isti ostendit; ab 
homine quae voluit in Dolabellam abstulit; istum testem produxit; dixit iste quae velle 
accusatorem putavit (Verr. 2.1.97). 
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Yet Cicero tells us that Verres was a proquaestor; hence he was liable to the 
quaestio de repetundis (and not a civil court) in his own right.25 Admittedly 
Cicero says that he himself could use the same tactics to procure a "large 
number" of witnesses against Verres' governorship, and at first sight this would 
seem to imply that many people, presumably not all of them magistrates, were 
liable to the lex de repetundis.26 However, as Buckland's second example will 
show, non-magistrates could be charged in civil cases and Cicero may be 
referring to them. Cicero's "large number" of witnesses would then resemble 
Verres only in that they too could be threatened with prosecution; the specific 
charges would not be under the same law. 
This second example, one rather more relevant to our case, is Q. Apronius, 
Verres' partner in pillaging Sicily. Apronius was the leader of the equestrian 
publicani who collected the tithe in Sicily.27 Being an eques Romanus and not 
an elected magistrate, Apronius was not subject to the quaestio de repetundis, 
but was haled before the court of Verres' successor in Sicily, L. Metellus. A 
senator, C. Gallus, accused Apronius under a provision of Metellus' edict, the 
formula Octaviana, which allowed for the restoration of property extorted 
through the threat of violence.28 As it turned out, Metellus, who was acting in 
Verres' interest, rejected Gallus' suit - not, however, as being inapplicable to 
Apronius, but in order not to prejudice any eventual case against Verres.29 
Buckland was not interested in clearing up the details of the "obscure story" of 
C. Antonius' trial beyond proving Mommsen's interpretation untenable, so he 
did not go on to investigate other cases which give us information about the 
general liability of subordinates. 
IV. The Accountability of Subordinates 
Cicero gives evidence that junior subordinates were not subject to the lex de 
repetundis. He reports that in 55 Pompey brought the matter of the law's scope 
25 Pro quaestore vero quo modo iste commune Milyadum vexarit... non est necesse demon- 
strare (Verr. 2.1.95). 
26 Quo ex genere mihi testium qui cum istofurati sunt, si uti voluissem, magna copiafuisset 
qui ut se periculo litium, coniunctione criminum liberarent, quo ego vellem descensuros 
pollicebantur (Verr. 2.1.97). 
27 Eorum omnium qui decumani vocabantur princeps erat Q. ille Apronius (Verr. 2.3.22). 
Indeed 2.3.135-36 suggests that the problem was not that Apronius was a subordinate of 
Verres but that Verres was a partner of Apronius! 
28 Adventu L. Metelli praetoris... aditum est ad Metellum; eductus est Apronius. Eduxit vir 
primarius, C. Gallus senator; postulavit ab L. Metello ut ex edicto suo iudicium daret in 
Apronium, Quod per vim aut metum abstulisset, quam formulam Octavianam et Romae 
Metellus habuerat et habebat in provincia (Verr. 2.3.152). 
29 Non impetrat [sc. Gallus], cum hoc diceret Metellus, praeiudicium se de capite C. Verris 
per hoc iudicium nollefieri (Verr. 2.3.152). 
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before the senate and that only a few senators dared suggest that military 
tribunes, prefects, scribes and the whole retinue of the governor be made 
accountable under the lex Iulia de repetundis.30 Since this move to expand the 
law failed in 55, it is most unlikely that subordinates who were not themselves 
magistrates were liable under the lex Cornelia. 
Since the procedure de repetundis was fundamentally one of restoration 
(though it carried with it criminal implications), there might seem to be no 
reason to provide for further prosecution of subordinates if the lucre wound up 
in the possession of the magistrate in charge. However, this was clearly not 
always the case (think of Catullus' Mamurra - quis potest pati ... Mamurram 
habere quod Comata Gallia/habebat uncti et ultima Britannia [29.1-4] - for an 
example close to hand). And in the case brought by Scaurus against Dolabella 
responsibility for extortion might have been imputed to either the proquaestor 
Verres or the propraetor Dolabella. A provision introduced into the extortion 
law by C. Servilius Glaucia covered cases in which the subordinates themselves 
received a cut; they (and anyone else into whose hands such money came) were 
liable under the clause quo ea pecunia pervenerit. 
The workings of this clause are illustrated by the causa Serviliana of the 
50s B.C.31 M. Servilius, who had been on the staff of C. Claudius Pulcher in 
Asia in 55-53, was charged under the quo ea pecunia pervenerit clause of the 
lex Julia de repetundis, a clause which was invoked when a promagistrate had 
been found guilty of extortion (as Pulcher had been), but had effectively 
blocked recovery of the money by one means or another (Pulcher went into 
exile without leaving behind a sufficiency of attachable funds). In such circum- 
stances, the plaintiffs were entitled to seek payment from anyone to whom the 
money had gone (quo ea pecunia pervenerit), and the restriction of liability to 
elected magistrates no longer applied.32 Furthermore, Cicero makes clear in the 
30 Nam cum...consule Cn. Pompeio, de hac ipsa quaestione lsc. de repetundis] referente, 
existerent nonnullae sed perpaucae tamen acerbae sententiae, quae quidem censerent ut 
tribuni, ut praefecti, ut scribae, ut comites omnes magistratuum hac lege fsc. Julia de 
repetundisJ tenerentur, vos ipsi... et senatus frequens restitit..huic ordini [sc. equestri] 
ignem novum subici non sivistis (Rab. Post. 13). This question of Pompey's presumably 
did not come out of the blue and suggests that the lex lulia had been phrased in such a way 
as to be interpreted as allowing the prosecution of equites. Since the issue of equestrian 
immunity was so contentious, one doubts that such a rewording of the earlier statute could 
have been inadvertent. In any case, even if Caesar had wished to allow for such an 
interpretation, clearly equestrian opposition was too great. 
31 For a discussion of the stages of the proceedings against M. Servilius, see D.R. Shackle- 
ton Bailey on ad Fam. 8.8.3. 
32 The pronoun ea indicates that the same money was being sought in both trials, and in fact 
hearings stemming from the quo ea pecunia clause were held before the same iudices as 
had heard the repetundae case and had given the litis aestimatio. The only other Republi- 
can case in which this procedure is thought to have been invoked is the mysterious trial of 
C. Manilius in the last days of 66 (see J.T. Ramsey, "The prosecution of C. Manilius in 66 
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pro Rabirio Postumo that the clause quo ea pecunia pervenerit depended upon 
the prior conviction of someone under the lex de repetundis.33 Cicero also 
argues that the clause was only applied to those cited in the litis aestimatio, 
though his wording indicates that this was an argument based on earlier cases, 
not on the actual formula of the law itself.34 What is certain, however, is that 
this appendicula causae iudicatae, as Cicero calls the clause, was operative 
only as the result of a prior conviction and that in the absence of such a 
conviction and ensuing litis aestimatio no case could be lodged under the quo 
ea pecunia provision. Moreover, Cicero informs us that this clause was trans- 
ferred verbatim from the lex Servilia (doubtless Glaucia's) to the lex Cornelia, 
whence it was once more transferred to the lex Julia.35 We can thus be certain 
that the state of affairs described by Cicero in 54 would have been the same in 
76. When the praetor refused (for reasons which are not entirely clear36) to give 
the provincials an action against Servilius under the quo ea pecunia pervenerit 
clause, Q. Pilius instituted a charge de repetundis against him in his own right. 
From this we can conclude that Servilius held an elective post. 
But if Servilius and the youthful Verres were liable in their own right to the 
repetundae charge, such was not the case with C. Rabirius Postumus, the 
Roman eques from whom repayment was sought under this same quo ea 
pecunia pervenerit clause after the conviction (and withdrawal into exile) of A. 
Gabinius on a repetundae charge deriving from his governorship of Syria in 
57-54. Cicero tries to get around Rabirius' liability under the clause quo ea 
pecunia pervenerit by arguing that given the special circumstances of this case 
a conviction under the terms of the clause was tantamount to a conviction on the 
full repetundae charge, but he does not actually deny that Rabirius was liable 
under the clause. What he does do, however, is reveal that the normal defense 
for equestrian members of a governor's entourage was the claim that ultimately 
responsibility, like authority, lay with the governor: 
B.C. and Cicero's pro Manilio", Phoenix 34 [19801 323-36). So little is really known 
about this case that it cannot help us with our investigation of Antonius' trial. 
33 Est enim haec causa QUO EA PECUNIA PERVENERIT quasi quaedam appendicula causae 
iudicatae atque damnatae... lubet lex julia persequi ab eis ad quos ea pecunia, quam is 
ceperit qui damnatus sit, pervenerit (Rab. Post. 8). 
34 Erat enim haec consuetudo nota vobis quidem omnibus, sed, si usus magister est optimus, 
mihi debet esse notissima... Ita contendo, neminem umquam QUO EA PECUNIA PERVENERIT 
causam dixisse qui in aestimandis litibus appellatus non esset (Rab. Post. 9). It is clear 
that if the law itself explicitly restricted the clause's operation to those mentioned in the 
litis aestimatio, Cicero would have said so instead of arguing from prior application of the 
law. 
35 Hoc totidem verbis translatum caput est quotfuit non modo in Cornelia sed etiam ante in 
lege Servilia (Rab. Post. 9). 
36 The same praetor did allow the action when Pulcher's son came forward with allegations 
of collusive prosecution against Servilius, which supports Shackleton Bailey's sugges- 
tion that insufficient evidence was the reason for his initial refusal. 
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nam si Postumofraudifuerit, qui nec tribunus nec praefectus nec ex Italia 
comes necfamiliaris Gabinifuit, quonam se modo defendentposthac qui vestri 
ordinis cum magistratibus nostrisfuerint his causis implicati (Rab. Post. 19, cf. 
the list of subordinates at ? 13: tribuni, praefecti, scribae, comites magistratu- 
um). 
Much the same point can be demonstrated from the Verrines. At 2.2.26 
Cicero turns to address the argument that some of the crimes he ascribes to 
Verres were in fact committed only by his subordinates - praefecti, scribae, 
accensi, medici, haruspices and praecones37 - and that the money was paid to 
them and not to Verres.38 Cicero grants this but argues that these comites, 
Verres' manus, could have extorted money only through collusion with Verres.39 
Cicero asserts that this defence must be rejected because if it became necessary 
to prove that the magistrate was directly involved, no one would ever be 
convicted.40 Verres' attempt to shift responsibility to his subordinates was, it 
appears, a novel ploy: quae ista defensio est? Utrum adseveratur in hoc an 
temptatur? Mihi enim res nova est.41 Though Cicero is no doubt capable of 
distorting the truth, it seems hard to believe that he would have chosen to say 
this if it was generally the case that the accused would attempt to place the onus 
of his crimes on the subordinates who carried them out. The very fact that this 
dispute about the liability of subordinates was possible suggests that the lex 
Cornelia did not explicitly define the status of such men. Cicero's claim that the 
defence was a new ploy certainly implies that in the past their misdeeds had 
been imputed to their commander. The generality of his response suggests that 
Verres' defense had made a vague assertion without any precedents cited to 
back it up. It would seem then that while the status of subordinates was not 
directly spelled out in the lex Cornelia, normally subordinates who were not 
magistrates were not liable for prosecution. Rather their deeds were imputed to 
their commander. 
37 Comites illi tui delecti manus erant tuae; praefecti, scribae, accensi, medici, haruspices, 
praecones manus erant tuae (Verr. 2.2.26). 
38 At enim ad Verrem pecunia ista non pervenit (Verr. 2.2.26). 
39 Non est ista Verri numerata pecunia? Adiuvo te: mei quoque testes idem dicunt... nego 
tibi ipsi ullum nummum esse numeratum; sed cum ob tua decreta, ob edicta, ob imperia, 
ob iudicia pecuniae dabantur, non erat quaerendum cuius manu numerarentur, sed cuius 
iniuria cogerentur (Verr. 2.2.26). 
40 Nam si hanc defensionem probabitis, 'Non accepit ipse,' licet omnia de pecuniis repe- 
tundis iudicia tollatis. Nemo umquam reus tam nocens adducetur qui ista defensione non 
possit uti; etenim cum Verres utatur, quis erit umquam posthac reus tam perditus qui non 
ad Q. Muci innocentiam referatur, si cum isto conferatur? (Verr. 2.2.27). 
41 2.2.26. Cf. Verr. 2.2.27: neque nunc isti mihi Verrem defendere videntur quam in Verre 
defensionis temptare rationem. 
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V. The Praetor's Formula and the Prosecution of C. Antonius 
We can now return to Antonius, whose case was brought before the per- 
egrine praetor and whose trial was pronounced iniquum by the tribunes acting 
as a body. Why? What if Antonius had in fact received an appointment as 
praefectus? As we have seen, Asconius speaks of Antonius as if he were not a 
member of Sulla's army, yet his control of the equitum turmae suggests that he 
was a praefectus, most likely having acauired control over the equites through a 
sham prefecture, just as Scaptius did under Pulcher and wished to do under 
Cicero. In such circumstances, the promagistrate ought to have been held 
accountable,42 but the promagistrate from whom Antonius obtained his prefec- 
ture was long since out of the reach of any secular court. Not even the quo ea 
pecunia pervenerit clause was open to the Greeks in 76, since Sulla (unlike 
Pulcher and Gabinius) had never been convicted on a repetundae charge. Faced 
with this situation, what could be done about this man who, it seems, had not 
only abused his connections in Greece but had made himself pretty thoroughly 
objectionable in Rome as well (cf. Cicero's summary in the speech in toga 
candida: in exercitu Sullano praedonem, in introitu gladiatorem, in victoria 
quadrigarium, together with Asconius' comments, Asc. Tog. 88.21-2943)? 
It is clear from Asconius' account that Lucullus had accepted the case. 
What we hear of Lucullus' decision is consonant with the procedure of condic- 
tio or claim of property under the formulary system.44 There were two stages to 
this procedure. The first part took place before the magistrate and was termed in 
iure. Here, in the postulatio actionis, the plaintiff requested the magistrate to 
authorize trial on the basis of a particular formula. The formula could either 
derive from the inherited stock of formulae which the magistrate set out in his 
edict at the start of his term of office or be an entirely new formula made up to 
suit the particular occasion.45 If the magistrate accepted the case, he framed the 
formula as he saw fit and authorized with the words iudicium do the actual trial 
42 One might cite the prosecution of P. Rutilius Rufus, legatus of P. Mucius Scaevola 
(whatever the date of Scaevola's proconsulship). However, Scaevola left after nine 
months (Cic. ad Att. 5.17.5) and Rutilius must have been prosecuted for his three months 
as legatus pro praetore, taking upon himself the responsibilities of the absent proconsul; 
for this position the office of legatus pro praetore, see Th. Mommsen, Staatsrecht (n. 2 1) 
2,700. 
43 It is unclear at what point in a long and unattractive career Antonius acquired the tag 
"Hybrida", which, as Pliny tells us, was applied to men who were half-wild, like the 
mixed progeny of wild and domestic swine (N.H. 8.213). 
44 For a description of this system, see H. Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to the Study of 
Roman Law, 3rd ed. (Cambridge 1972) 199ff. 
45 Jolowicz, op.cit. (n. 44) 201-2. 
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of the case.46 This trial formed the second part of the condictio. It took place 
before a judge agreeable to both parties who reached his decision on the basis of 
the formula chosen by the praetor; this trial was termed apud iudicem or in 
iudicio. But if the formula chosen was unacceptable to the defendant, he could 
refuse it and back up his refusal through appeal to the tribunes.47 This is exactly 
what Antonius did.48. The verb eiurare (also appearing in the form eierare) 
often means to reject a judge as unfair,49 but in this instance Antonius rejects 
not the iudex but the iudicium itself, that is the phraseology of the formula 
granted by the praetor.50 When he appealed to the college of tribunes (appel- 
lavit tribunos), it reviewed the case and pronounced in his favor. 
46 The expression used is in ea (vel sim.) verba iudicium postulare (from the plaintiffs 
point of view) or dare (from the praetor's): Cic. Verr. 2.2.31, 2.3.69; Quinct. 63-64; Tull. 
12, 31, 38, 41. 
47 For a similar appellatio, cf. Asc. Mil. 47.2-9 (L. Novius tr. pl.... cum ... tribuni de 
appellatione cognoscerent, ita sententiam dixit: ... iudicium tollam), ... quid attinet te tam 
multis verbis a praetore postulare ut adderet in iudicium INIURIAM, et, quia non 
impetrasses, tribunos pl. appellare et hic in iudicio queri praetoris iniquitatem, quod de 
iniuria non addidisset? Tull. 38; also Cic. Vat. 33 (edixerit ne C. Memmius praetor ex ea 
lege [sc. Licinia et lunia] ut adesses die tricesimo? cum is dies venisset, fecerisne quod in 
hac re publica non modo factum antea numquam est, sed in omni memoria es. omnino 
inauditum? appellarisne tribunos plebis ne causam diceres ?). Less closely related are the 
appellationes mentioned at Verr. 2.2.100 and Quinct. 63-65 (fatetur enim [sc. Hortensi- 
us, Cicero's opposing counsel] ... Alfenum [the procurator of Cicero's client] ... iudicium 
quin acciperet in ea verba quae Naevius edebat non recusasse, Cic. Quinct. 63). Sulla, for 
all the restrictions he imposed on the tribunate, did leave the college its ius auxili (Sullam 
probo, qui tribunis plebis sua lege iniuriaefaciendae potestatem ademerit, auxiliferendi 
reliquerit, Cic. Leg. 3.22). Tribunal intercession in judicial matters is discussed by 
Mommsen, Staatsrecht (n. 21) 1.274ff., M. Kaser, Das romische Zivilprozefirecht (Mu- 
nich 1966) 125-26, L. Thommen, Das Volkstribunat der spaten romischen Republik. 
Historia Einzelschriften 59 (Stuttgart 1988) 233-41. 
48 Note that one of the censors' reasons for expelling Antonius was quod iudicium recusarit, 
almost exactly the same words as Cicero used of Quinctius' agent Alfenus (see preceding 
note). A.H.J. Greenidge, The Legal Procedure of Cicero's Time (Oxford 1901) 266 n. 4 
correctly recognized the nature of Antonius' rejection. 
49 OLD sv 2; note esp. Cic. de Or. 2.285: cum ei [sc. Scipioni qui Ti. Gracchum perculit] M. 
Flaccus multis probris obiectis P. Mucium iudicem tulisset, 'eiero,' inquit, 'iniquus est'; 
cum esset admurmuratum, 'ah,' inquit, 'patres conscripti, non ego mihi illum iniquum 
eiero, verum omnibus'. Also Verr. 2.3.137 (when a sponsio involving himself is brought 
before Verres, he refuses to grant the plaintiff Scandilius' request that Verres choose the 
recuperatores from among the local traders): Scandilius postulare de conventu recupera- 
tores. Tum iste negat se de existimatione sua cuiquam nisi suis commissurum. Negotia- 
tores sibi putant esse turpe id forum sibi iniquum eierare ubi negotientur; praetor 
provinciam suam sibi totam iniquam eierat. 
50 Note that in 59, when Antonius was on trial again, the Caesarian tribune Vatinius was 
careful to prevent him from enjoying the benefits of his new lex de alternis consiliis 
reiciendis, which modified the procedure of jury selection in favor of defendants (postea 
quam ille [sc. Antonius] est reusfactus, statim tuleris in eum 'qui tuam post legem reus 
factus esset,' ut homo consularis exclusus miser puncto temporis spoliaretur beneficio et 
aequitate legis tuae? Vat. 27). Perhaps this is a reflection of Caesar's frustration with 
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According to Asconius, Antonius swore to the tribunes that he rejected the 
iudicium quod aequo iure uti non posset. What exactly does aequum ius mean? 
Cicero seems to use the phrase exclusively to protest against situations in which 
civil procedure, especially the wording of the formula, has been manipulated to 
the disadvantage of one of the litigants.5" He even uses the same phrase as that 
of Asconius, aequo iure uti, in connection with the fact that whereas Verres 
used an unusual formula as urban praetor (having been bribed, according to 
Cicero, by one of the litigants to do so), he inserted the normal one in his 
edictum in Sicily.52 Cicero asks Verres utrum digniores homines existimasti eos 
qui habitant in provincia quam nos qui aequo iure uteremur, an aliud Romae 
aequum est, aliud in Sicilia? 53 The fact that the tribunes sustained Antonius' 
objections strongly suggests that there must have been a case against the 
iudicium that Lucullus was setting up, and the phrase ius aequum suggests that 
the objection concerned the wording of the decree.54 
That it was a specific decision of Lucullus' which led to Antonius' appeal is 
clear from Asconius' phrase cum Lucullus id quod postulabant decrevisset.55 
Antonius' evasion in 76. On the trial de pecuniis repetundis in 59, see E. S. Gruen, "The 
trial of C. Antonius", Latomus 32 (1973) 301-10. 
51 After Verres incites the palaestritae of Syracuse to contest an inheritance against a 
Sicilian named Heraclius, Heraclius cum advocatis adit et postulat ut sibi cum palaestri- 
tis, hoc est cum populo Syracusano, aequo iure disceptare liceat (Verr. 2.2.38). The next 
sentence shows that the dispute is over a matter of procedure: while the palaestritae ask 
that those men be given as judges qui Verri viderentur, Heraclius wants them chosen in 
the customary manner ex lege Rupilia (cf. Top. 23.8 valeat aequitas, quae paribus in 
causis paria iura desiderat). In another passage of the Verrines, Cicero decries that 
section of Verres' edictum in which he stated that he would award the decumani as much 
as they claimed a farmer owed them (Verr. 2.3.25-26). He ironically wonders, venient 
[sc. aratores] Syracusas ut te praetore videlicet aequo iure Apronium, delicias ac vitam 
tuam, iudicio recuperatorio persequantur? Although it is not stated explicitly what is 
meant by aequum ius, the context makes it clear that the issue is the wording of the 
formula they would be granted. In another passage of the same speech, when Cicero feels 
compelled to justify his prosecution of Verres, he insists (via a rhetorical question) that 
any just person would loathe Verres: qui iure aequo omnis putat esse oportere, is tibi non 
infestissimus sit, cum cogitet varietatem libidinemque decretorum tuorum? This seems to 
be another use of ius aequum in reference to Verres' perversion of the formulary system 
(see Verr. 2.1.104-127). 
52 Verr. 2.1.114-18. 
53 Verr.2.1.118. 
54 In the pro Tullio, Cicero records a very similar set of events. His opponents had argued at 
great length that the praetor should add the word iniuria to the formula; after the praetor 
refused to do so they took the matter up with the tribunes (... quid attinet te tam multis 
verbis a praetore postulare ut adderet in iudicium INIURIAM, et, quia non impetrasses, 
tribunos pl. appellare et hic in iudicio queri praetoris iniquitatem, quod de iniuria non 
addidisset? Tull. 38). 
55 At this point one might note the clever way in which Cicero misrepresents the situation (a 
dozen or so years after the fact) when he "quotes" Antonius in the in toga candida, saying 
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The meaning of the verb decernere in civil procedure has caused some of the 
confusion about the details of this case. Buckland thought the praetor accepted 
Antonius' name for trial by a quaestio, but there was no quaestio under his 
control and the verb decerno is not used of such praetorian decisions.56 M. 
Alexander's statement that Antonius was convicted in this trial is another 
misinterpretation of decernere.57 It is clear, however, from a passage in the pro 
Quinctio, that decernere can be used of a- procedural decision (not a final 
verdict): decernit ... iubet [sc. Cn. Dolabella praetor] P. Quinctium sponsionem 
cum Sex. Naevio facere: si bona sua ex edicto P. Burrieni praetoris dies xxx 
possessa non essent (Quinct. 30). In the passage from the pro Tullio referred to 
just above decerno actually describes the praetor's decision in framing the 
wording of the formula: at quibus verbis in decernendo Metellus usus est 
ceterique quos appellasti? (Tull. 39).58 Furthermore, postulare is the verb used 
for the plaintiffs request for a formula.59 It was Lucullus' formula, then, that 
was objectionable. But in what particulars? 
As we have seen, as a prefect Antonius was not liable to a repetundae 
charge in his own right, and without a prior conviction of Sulla could not be 
prosecuted under the quo ea pecunia pervenerit clause. There was thus no 
recourse open to the Greeks through public law. What of civil law? Obviously, 
this was not available to the Greeks as Greeks, since the ius civile was restricted 
in sua civitate cum peregrino negavit se iudicio aequo certare posse. While Antonius 
claimed that he could not receive justice (aequo iure uti), Cicero presents him as claiming 
that he cannot litigate (certare non posse) in a fair trial (iudicio aequo). By adding the 
seemingly harmless prepositional phrase cum peregrino Cicero makes the alteration even 
more effective: not only could Antonius not prevail in a fair trial, but not even in a fair 
trial against a foreigner! Only the most careful listener would have noticed how complete- 
ly the subtle changes in wording subvert Antonius' argument. For certare with an ablative 
stating the basis of a trial cf. Cic. Verr. 2.2.32 (ut quod civis cum cive agat domi certaret 
suis legibus), 2.2.39 (ius esse certum Siculis inter se quo iure certarent), CIL 12 600.5 
(SEI IS... D(E) R(E) IUDICIO CERTARE <VOLET>), Ulpian Dig. 25.3.5.18 (quo minus 
praeiudicio certare possit). The author of the Commentariolum petitionis rephrases the 
insult inaccurately (vocem denique audivimus iurantis se Romae iudicio aequo cum 
homine Graeco certare non posse [8]): now iudicio aequo appears in a somewhat peculiar 
collocation with Romae and cum homine Graeco as one of the advantages Antonius has 
over his opponent. 
56 W. W. Buckland, op.cit. (n. 22) 43. 
57 Trials in the Late Roman Republic, 149 B.C. to 50 B.C. (Toronto 1990) 71-72. His notion 
that Antonius' goods were sold as a result of the conviction must be a deduction from the 
censors' reference in Asconius to Antonius not having possession of his property (but that 
is explicitly ascribed to debt: quod propter aeris alieni magnitudinem praedia manciparit 
bonaque sua in potestate non habeat). 
58 F. Serrao, La 'iurisdictio' delpretoreperegrino (Milan 1954) 85 understood the implica- 
tions of the verb for the situation, but did not elaborate on the nature of Antonius' case. 
59 Cf. Cic. Quinct. 25, 30, 36 et passim, Verr. 2.2.38, 2.2.59, Tull. 38, Inv. 2.59; see 
Jolowicz, op.cit. (n. 44) 201. 
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to citizens. However, the civil law had been opened up for the claims made by 
and against foreigners through thefictio, a device whereby something not true 
is assumed, for reasons of equity, to be true for the purposes of litigation.60 
Gaius explicitly mentions afictio which pretended that peregrines were citizens 
in order to allow them to lodge complaints or have complaints lodged against 
them in cases involving theft and wrongful damage.61 For Varro Lucullus to 
grant the Greeks (or rather, a Greek, cf. Cicero's phrase cum homine Graeco) 
access to the civil law, he had to agree to grant afictio of citizenship for him. 
This action itself might be the decision of Lucullus which led to Antonius' 
appeal to the tribunes. Cicero informs us that while the lex de repetundis had 
been created to provide justice to Rome's allies, citizens normally recovered 
monies extorted from them through the civil law.62 Antonius could have claimed 
that there was a properly constituted quaestio to cover the kind of claim made 
by the Greeks: actions committed by Sulla's army should be imputed to the 
commander. If Sulla had not been indicted yet and was no longer indictable, 
that was not Antonius' fault. Antonius could further point to the dangers 
inherent in allowing the prosecution by provincials of even the most insignifi- 
cant junior commander in civil court once the commander was dead.63 
We cannot tell whether this attempt by provincials to seek redress against a 
former official through the civil law instead of the quaestio de repetundis was a 
novel approach or whether it had been attempted before, but Cicero's statement 
that the latter court was specially instituted for the allies' sake and the fact that 
no other such attempt by provincials to use the civil courts is known to us 
suggest that Lucullus' decretum was in fact a novelty. Varro Lucullus might 
well have had full information about the activities of the prefect Antonius (his 
60 Fictiones are discussed by Gaius Inst. 4.34-8. For fictiones preserved in Republican 
documents, see lex Rubria (Bruns 16) 1.22-25, 32-35; the tabula Contrebiensis 6 (most 
accurate text published by G. Fatds, Antiquity 57 [19831 13). The fictio in the latter is 
discussed by J. S. Richardson, "The Tabula Contrebiensis: Roman Law in Spain in the 
Early First Century B.C.", JRS 73 (1983) 38-8, and P. Birks, A. Roger, J.S. Richardson, 
"Further Aspects of the Tabula Contrebiensis", JRS 74 (1984) 52-54, though their 
conclusions are unacceptable: see E. Badian and C. Mackay, "Notes on the Contrebia 
Bronze", in Homenaje al Profesor Blazquez (forthcoming). 
61 Item civitas peregrinofingitur si eo nomine agat aut cum eo agatur, quo nomine nostris 
legibus actio constituta est. si modo iustum sit eam actionem etiam ad peregrinum extendi 
... item si peregrinus furti agat, civitas ei Romana fingitur. similiter si ex lege Aquilia 
peregrinus damni iniuriae agat aut cum eo agatur, ficta civitate Romana iudicium datur 
(Gaius Inst. 4.37). 
62 ... quasi vero dubium sit quin tota lex de pecuniis repetundis sociorum causa constituta 
sit; nam civibus cum sunt ereptae pecuniae, civilifere actione et privato iure repetuntur 
(Cic. in Caec. 17-18). 
63 One might compare the argument used by Cicero in Rab. Post. 13-19 regarding the 
dangers of the precedent of convicting the equestrian Rabirius under the lex de repe- 
tundis. 
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brother L. Licinius Lucullus having been Sulla's dutiful and capable quaestor), 
and may have felt that Antonius' apparently outrageous behavior deserved 
special treatment. 
If Lucullus did allow the Greeks access to the civil courts, he obviously 
granted them some specific formula. It is interesting to note that the only other 
fact known about Lucullus' praetorship is his famous improvement upon the lex 
Aquilia. Whereas the lex Aquilia dealt with damnum iniuria datum, Lucullus' 
new formula -QVANTAE PECVNIAE PARET DOLO MALO FAMILIAE P. FABI VI HOMINIBVS 
ARMATIS COACTISVE DAMNVM DATVM ESSE M. TVLLIO - was a response to the 
lawlessness of the Italian countryside in the 70s and dispensed with the adverb 
iniuria in an attempt to make conviction easier.64 This new formula clearly 
concerned the sphere of Roman citizens and it has long been a source of 
consternation among the students of Roman law how the peregrine praetor 
should have established a formula concerning citizens. Perhaps Lucullus held 
both the urban and peregrine praetorships.65 If Lucullus was willing to find new 
solutions for the problems of the Italian countryside, it should not be surprising 
if he was open to the possibility of innovations in the area of provincial 
corruption. 
Wlassak, followed by Serrao, suggested that it was precisely Lucullus' own 
new formula which the Greeks asked him to apply to their own situation. This 
would of course require a retroactive application of the edict, and Cicero is very 
harsh on Verres for having done just this at Verr. 2.1.107ff. But Cicero also 
mentions an 'escape clause' which might well have been invoked in connection 
with the depredations of Antonius: neque in ulla [sc. lege] praeteritum tempus 
reprehenditur nisi eius rei quae sua sponte tam scelerata et nefaria est ut, 
etiamsi lex non esset, magnopere vitanda fuit. Another formula that Lucullus 
might have used is theformula Octaviana QUOD PER VIM AVT METVM ABSTVLISSET 
which was requested against Verres' henchman Apronius.66 This formula, 
which allows for exactions made by virtue of metus as well as actual violence, 
would perhaps square better with Plutarch's Swpo6oKia. We have seen that 
Plutarch's story is garbled, but &opo6oKict would not be out of line as a 
translation of dona capere, and Mommsen stated long ago that donum captum is 
what the author of the tabula Bembina meant by conciliatum in the list of 
64 Cic. Tull. 8-12 explains Lucullus' motivations and the historical setting that impelled his 
action. 
65 Only two years before, L. Sisenna held both praetorships (CIL 12 588); apparently Sulla's 
new regime of quaestiones perpetuae brought a shortage of praetors in its wake. M. 
Voigt, Romische Rechtsgeschichte (Leipzig 1892-1902, repr. 1963) 1.721 with n. 18 
recognized this explanation, but the lawyers seem resistent; see B. Frier, The Rise of the 
Roman Jurists (Princeton 1985) 52 n. 38, A. Watson, Law Making in the Later Roman 
Republic (Oxford 1974) 65-67, L. Labruna, Vim fieri veto: alle radici di una ideologia 
(Naples 1971) 19 n. 41. 
66 See note 28 above. 
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actions liable in cases of extortion (ablatum captum coactum conciliatum 
aversum, ? 3).67 Venturini has a fuller discussion on the meaning of concilia- 
tum, and shows how it is frequently paired with captum, with the first referring 
to the agent who did the coercing, the second to the eventual receiver.68 As, for 
example, in one of Cicero's letters about the panthers that Caelius wanted so 
badly: ... docuique nec mihi conciliare pecuniam licere nec illi capere, monui- 
que eum, quem plane diligo, ut cum alios accusasset cautius viveret; illud 
autem alterum alienum esse existimatione mea, Cibyratas imperio meo publice 
venari (ad Att. 6.1.21). Of course we have gone to great lengths to show that 
technically speaking Antonius was not charged with extortion, but nevertheless 
the incidents involved were clearly comparable with those appearing in repe- 
tundae cases.69 If Plutarch did not care to reflect the legal technicalities that we 
have been describing in this paper, he might well have described Antonius' 
exactions as &opo5oxchx.70 
We have examined the nature of the charge brought against Antonius in 76 
and suggested some expedients by which the plaintiffs and praetor might have 
gotten around Antonius' non-liability to the repetundae charge. There remains 
the question of why the case was brought at this particular moment so long after 
the events for which Antonius was being prosecuted. Antonius took part in 
67 Gesammelte Schriften (Berlin 1905) 1. 48. Donum capere is one of the actions forbidden 
to senators and magistrates by Cicero at Leg. 3.1 1: donum ne capiunto neve danto neve 
petenda neve gerenda neve gesta potestate (cf. Dig. 1. 18.18. pr. I). Note also Hor. Carm. 
3.8.25-28, where the phrase dona capere helps sharpen the contrast between public 
responsibilities and private relaxation: the privatus can do what the public figure cannot, 
dona capere. 
68 Venturini, op.cit. (n. 14) pp. 292-303. 
69 A particularly good example of the sort of thing he is likely to have been involved in is 
described at Verr. 2.1.95-6: pro quaestore vero quo modo iste commune Milyadum 
vexarit, quo modo Lyciam, Pamphyliam, Pisidiam, Phrygiamque totam frumento imper- 
ando, aestimando, hac sua, quam tum primum excogitavit, Siciliensi aestimatione adflix- 
erit, non est necesse demonstrare verbis: hoc scitote, cum iste civitatibus frumentum, 
coria, cilicia, saccos imperaret, neque ea sumeret proque iis rebus pecuniam exigeret - 
his nominibus solis Cn. Dolabellae HS ad triciens litem esse aestimatam. quae omnia, 
etiamsi voluntate Dolabellae fiebant, per istum tamen omnia gerebantur. ... te haec 
coegisse, te aestimasse, tibi pecuniam numeratam esse dico, eademque vi et iniuria, cum 
pecunias maximas cogeres, per omnis partis provinciae te tamquam aliquam calami- 
tosam tempestatem pestemque pervasisse demonstro. 
70 Plutarch uses the word in connection with the activities of Roman politicians in 10 places 
besides this one. In 5 of those it appears in the plural and means either "bribes" (Pomp. 
51.2, Cat. Min. 43.7, 44.1) or a widespread "habit of taking bribes" (Cat. Min. 35.5, 47. 1), 
in 2 it refers to the bribe-taking of iudices (Cor. 14.3, Pomp. 55.3), in 2 it refers to bribes 
taken from foreign kings (Gracch. 39.2, Cat. Min. 15.3). At 0th. 6.4, however, it appears 
in a context rather like that of Antonius: oad1tov i OadXkevta t6v e'repov aVrpaaTqy6v OITE 
&playct noXepIi(ov oike ickonict Kcit &pobodat tap& augga,xwv ?E'vuriXaoav xprlsccTt- 
?6tEVOV. 
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Sulla's triumph and so should have been available for prosecution before 76 
(Asc. Tog. 88.21-29, quoted on p. 47 above). Perhaps the Greeks' advocate, C. 
Julius Caesar, was the driving force behind the accusation. Just before, in 77 or 
perhaps even in 76, he had tried to make a name for himself through his 
(unsuccessful) prosecution of Cn. Cornelius Dolabella for repetundae as gover- 
nor of Macedon.71 This prosecution was apparently a cause cele'bre and has left 
a much larger trace in the record than the case involving Antonius. Plutarch 
states that Caesar took on the latter case to pay back the Greeks for their zeal on 
his behalf.72 This is likely a garbled reference to some statement by Caesar to 
the effect that his prosecution of Antonius was motived by his sense of fides 
towards the Greeks who exhibited proper studia erga se (which does not 
preclude his being the moving force in the case).73 Caesar's later career shows 
him to have been masterful at manipulating Roman political institutions to his 
advantage. Caesar may simply have decided to try the gambit of a civil prosecu- 
tion of Antonius after learning the details of the case from the Greeks during his 
prosecution of Dolabella.74 However, it may also be the case that Lucullus' 
being praetor influenced his decision. As we have seen, this praetor showed 
himself both open to new procedures and actively opposed to lawlessness. 
Furthermore, Caesar may have been brought to Lucullus' attention by Lucullus' 
brother, who had been a commander at the siege of Mytilene where Caesar 
71 Dolabella was succeded in Macedon by Ap. Claudius Pulcher cos. 79. The latter should 
thus have gone out to replace Dolabella in 78. However, he fell ill on the way (Sall. Hist. 
1.127M) and is attested in Rome as interrex at the start of 77 (Sall. Hist. 1.77.22M). 
Hence the earliest date for the prosecution is 77 and there is no particular eason why it 
could not have fallen in 76. Suetonius suggests that Caesar waited until the recent civil 
unrest was quelled before instigating the prosecution (Caes. 4. 1). 
72 dpsiP6levoq ri'v 'EXkXai nj ipoOtpliaq (Caes. 4.2). It is only Plutarch who indicates 
the relative chronology of the case of Antonius and that of Dolabella. Suetonius seems to 
imply that the case of Dolabella came second by stating that Caesar left Rome for Rhodes 
after his acquittal to avoid the invidia and to attend rhetorical lectures: absolutoque 
Rhodum secedere statuit, et ad declinandam invidiam et ut per otium et requiem Apollon- 
io Moloni clarissimo tunc dicendi magistro operam daret (Caes. 4.1). However, such 
imputations of motives are inherently suspicious and are likely to be mere guess-work. 
That being so, Suetonius is likely simply to have ignored the less significant case of 
Antonius and to have erroneously connected the acquittal and the departure. 
73 One might compare a similar sentiment in a fragment of his speech pro Bithynis (vel pro 
hospitio regis Nicomedis vel pro horum necessitate quorum res agitur, refugere hoc 
munus, M. lunce, non potui. nam neque hominum morte memoria deleri debet quin a 
proximis retineatur neque clientes sine summa infamia deseri possunt, quibus etiam a 
propinquis nostris opemferre instituimus [ORF3 fr. 44]) and compare the defence Cicero 
feels obligated to make of his own prosecution of Verres in in Caec. 2-5. 
74 At this time the governor of Macedon was responsible for the jurisdiction of Greece (see 
above n. 13), so Greeks from Greece proper could well have participated in Dolabella's 
case. 
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received the corona civica.75 Lucullus' motives are not obvious. One might 
think that the case was an indirect criticism of Sulla's behavior as commander, 
but what we know about Lucullus shows him to be a staunch optimate and 
defender of the Sullan constitution. Hence he is unlikely to have been acting in 
any sense that could be construed as anti-Sullan. One suspects, however, that 
there was no love lost between the upright Lucullus and the rather despicable 
Antonius. Certainly, the very act of accepting the case is indicative of hostili- 
ty.76 Who knows, maybe Lucullus was actually interested in seeing justice done 
and looked favorably upon the idea of supplementing loopholes in the lex de 
repetundis through civil action. Although the tribunes were convinced of the 
inequity of Lucullus' new procedure, the censors implicitly recognized the 
justice and equity of it by citing Antonius' shunning of the case as grounds for 
expelling him from the senate.77 
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. Cynthia Damon 
and Christopher S. Mackay 
75 Suetonius tells us that Caesar received the corona while serving in the contubernium of 
M. Thermus, who was apparently the governor of Asia (Caes. 2). Plutarch, however, 
speaks of Lucullus as commander of the attack (Luc. 4.3) and Caesar was probably 
actually under his command even though Thermus granted him the corona; see D. Magie, 
Roman Rule in Asia Minor (Princeton 1950) 2.1124 n. 41. 
76 One might contrast L. Metellus' obstruction of the case against Apronius in Verres' 
behalf (Verr. 2.3.152-53). 
77 On the censorial nota as a penalty for abuses that the judicial system proper failed to 
punish, cf. Cic. in Caec. 8: iudiciorum desiderio tribunicia potestas efflagitata est, 
iudiciorum levitate ordo quoque alius ad res iudicandas postulatur, iudicum culpa atque 
dedecore etiam censorium nomen, quod asperius antea populo videri solebat, id nunc 
poscitur, id iam populare et plausibile factum est. (Pliny attests to the survival of this 
notion under the principate at Ep. 9.13.16.) 
